Here's something to wonder about: is pride really the crown of the virtues? In his book "Revaluing Ethics: Aristotle's Dialectical Pedagogy", Thomas W. Smith makes a pretty compelling case that Aristotle's discussion of megalopsuchia might be a dead end that leads Aristotle to make one of his famous fresh starts. Consider, for instance, that the great-souled man is described as "inert" (ἄργον), which is the very opposite of the deep activity (ἐνέργεια) that characterizes both arete and eudaimonia. Also, the word commonly rendered as "crown" (κόσμος) can also mean "adornment" or even "bauble". Indeed, i's not even clear to me that "pride" is the best rendering of μεγαλοψυχία. Reading Smith's treatment of the topic certainly set me to wondering...
You raise some thought-provoking points, Peter--thank you! I have not read Smith's book, so I cannot attest to the quality of his argumentation.
While I do not agree with every aspect of Joe Sachs's translation of Nicomachean Ethics, he has some fascinating commentary augmenting his translation that I find plausible. For example, when discussing how to understand the nuance of "cosmos" in this context, which Sachs translates as "adornment," he says: "adornment . . . is now seen as the sense of worth that comes from virtue of character rather than from money or empty self-esteem. Greatness of soul is the first of four virtues that Aristotle will find to require the presence of all the virtues of character." That's why I refer to this as the "jewel in the crown" of the virtues: it emerges--and can only emerge--sparkling atop all the others after all the others have been achieved. It is not a passive emergence either. The person of excellent moral virtue needs to know and recognize properly the greatness he has achieved--that takes work.
I myself stick close to the Greek in translating megalopsuchia as "greatness of soul." Where pride comes in, I think, is when unpacking what greatness of soul involves. The sense of self-worth (auto axios) that the great-souled has based on his correct assessment that he really possesses an excellent character that he has achieved, I would argue, is what it means to be proud.
With regard to the context in which "argon" (inert, idle, or full of delay) is used, it is a qualified comparison: "It is also characteristic of [the great-souled] not to go after things held in popular esteem, nor those in which other people are pre-eminent, and to be a slow starter and full of delay, except where there is great honor or a great deed, and to be inclined to do few things, but great and notable ones." Contextualized, this does not imply that the great-souled person is "inert," but that he is highly selective about which endeavors are worth it for him to undertake. Once chosen, those endeavors are lofty, demanding, and will take the best actualization of himself that he can bring to the task at hand.
Hi Carrie-Ann! Without going too deep into Aristotle interpretation (you and I could geek out on that all day long, but your readers might not be into it!), I'll say this: it does strike me that the very crown of the virtues can't be disclosed so early in the Nicomachean Ethics (Book IV). Sachs himself notes that in Book VIII or VIII, Aristotle discloses love/friendship (philia) as the greatest of the external goods. Because greatness of soul focuses on the second-best external good of honor, it has to be superseded by something greater, which is love/friendship in all its forms and eventually the love of wisdom.
Thank you for inviting me to wonder more deeply about this, Peter! Don't be surprised to find an aspect of this exchange (likely on love/friendship, but I'm not yet sure) later turned into a "mailbag question" post on Weekly Wonderings. :o)
Here's something to wonder about: is pride really the crown of the virtues? In his book "Revaluing Ethics: Aristotle's Dialectical Pedagogy", Thomas W. Smith makes a pretty compelling case that Aristotle's discussion of megalopsuchia might be a dead end that leads Aristotle to make one of his famous fresh starts. Consider, for instance, that the great-souled man is described as "inert" (ἄργον), which is the very opposite of the deep activity (ἐνέργεια) that characterizes both arete and eudaimonia. Also, the word commonly rendered as "crown" (κόσμος) can also mean "adornment" or even "bauble". Indeed, i's not even clear to me that "pride" is the best rendering of μεγαλοψυχία. Reading Smith's treatment of the topic certainly set me to wondering...
You raise some thought-provoking points, Peter--thank you! I have not read Smith's book, so I cannot attest to the quality of his argumentation.
While I do not agree with every aspect of Joe Sachs's translation of Nicomachean Ethics, he has some fascinating commentary augmenting his translation that I find plausible. For example, when discussing how to understand the nuance of "cosmos" in this context, which Sachs translates as "adornment," he says: "adornment . . . is now seen as the sense of worth that comes from virtue of character rather than from money or empty self-esteem. Greatness of soul is the first of four virtues that Aristotle will find to require the presence of all the virtues of character." That's why I refer to this as the "jewel in the crown" of the virtues: it emerges--and can only emerge--sparkling atop all the others after all the others have been achieved. It is not a passive emergence either. The person of excellent moral virtue needs to know and recognize properly the greatness he has achieved--that takes work.
I myself stick close to the Greek in translating megalopsuchia as "greatness of soul." Where pride comes in, I think, is when unpacking what greatness of soul involves. The sense of self-worth (auto axios) that the great-souled has based on his correct assessment that he really possesses an excellent character that he has achieved, I would argue, is what it means to be proud.
With regard to the context in which "argon" (inert, idle, or full of delay) is used, it is a qualified comparison: "It is also characteristic of [the great-souled] not to go after things held in popular esteem, nor those in which other people are pre-eminent, and to be a slow starter and full of delay, except where there is great honor or a great deed, and to be inclined to do few things, but great and notable ones." Contextualized, this does not imply that the great-souled person is "inert," but that he is highly selective about which endeavors are worth it for him to undertake. Once chosen, those endeavors are lofty, demanding, and will take the best actualization of himself that he can bring to the task at hand.
Hi Carrie-Ann! Without going too deep into Aristotle interpretation (you and I could geek out on that all day long, but your readers might not be into it!), I'll say this: it does strike me that the very crown of the virtues can't be disclosed so early in the Nicomachean Ethics (Book IV). Sachs himself notes that in Book VIII or VIII, Aristotle discloses love/friendship (philia) as the greatest of the external goods. Because greatness of soul focuses on the second-best external good of honor, it has to be superseded by something greater, which is love/friendship in all its forms and eventually the love of wisdom.
Thank you for inviting me to wonder more deeply about this, Peter! Don't be surprised to find an aspect of this exchange (likely on love/friendship, but I'm not yet sure) later turned into a "mailbag question" post on Weekly Wonderings. :o)